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Abstract:  
 
The paper asks two questions. One, what is the size of the effect of the increase 
in real oil price on competitiveness of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries –the real exchange rate is a measure of competitiveness – and two, 
given recent concerns about the sliding greenback and the consequent income 
and inflationary problems, would the GCC countries been “better off” had they 
pegged their currencies to the Euro dollar in 1991?  To answer these questions 
we model and estimate the effect of oil prices on the competitiveness for the 
GCC then we provide a test statistic to test whether the conditional variance of 
the model has remained stable under the US dollar peg compared to a 
counterfactual scenario, where the GCC countries peg their currencies to the 
Euro dollar in 1991.  We find the effect of the increase in the real price of oil on 
competitiveness of the GCC countries to be small, most of the domestic inflation 
is imported, and that there is a relatively large variation among the GCC 
economies with respect to the currency peg.  The financial problems the GCC 
countries face today are not about which currency (or a basket of currencies) 
they should peg to, but rather about the choice of the monetary arrangement as a 
whole.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The six GCC countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) produce about 23 percent of the world’s oil and 
control more than 40 percent of the world’s oil reserves.  Oil is the main 
commodity they produce and export.  The spot and future prices of oil have been 
rising because of foreign excess demand, among the main reasons.   
 
Inflationary pressures increased along with recent economic growth. The size of 
these pressures depend on what index is used.  Table 1 reports the averages 
over the sample from 1970 to 2006 (all data are found in appendix 1).  It reports 
the average GDP deflator and the CPI inflation rates.  It also reports the GDP 
deflator and the CPI inflation rates in 2006 (boldface and in parentheses).  
Clearly, there is a lot of inflation in 2006 relative to the average, if we take the 
deflator.2  Further, we took the average of the CPI and the deflator inflation rates 
for each country over the period then computed what we call the GCC-wide 
average inflation, which is 5.5 percent.  Figure 1 shows that the deflator in each 
country is above the average inflation in the GCC countries.  The CPI, on the 
other hand, has been rising slowly and just about equal to the average in 2006.        
 
The GCC incomes grew substantially as a result of the increase in foreign 
demand and oil prices.  This foreign excess demand is expected to persist.  
Table 1 reports the real GDP growth rates in 2006 (in boldface and in 
parentheses) and the country’s average growth rates over the sample from 1970 
to 2006.  GDP growth rates in 2006 exceed the average growth rate over the 
sample, except in the cases of Oman and Saudi Arabia which grew at the 
average.3 
 
Figure 2 is a scatter plot of the GCC GDP growth rate averages and the change 
in the domestic GDP deflator inflation rate as a proxy for the inflation’s deviation 
from expected inflation.  There is a negative relationship with a small correlation 
coefficient equal to -0.33.  This seems to suggest that the dominant shock to the 
GCC economies has been a supply shock, i.e., perhaps an increase in the 
production, where oil has the biggest share.  Note how Bahrain and Oman seem 
to differ from the group and how Kuwait seem to be separated from the others.   
 
The GCC countries maintain fixed exchange rate regimes.  Recently, the GCC 
countries have been complaining about the continuous depreciation of the US
                                                 
2 The CPI does not include oil prices and construction costs, the GDP deflator does.  The 
correlation between oil price inflation and the GDP deflator inflation is very high in all GCC 
countries.  There is no significant correlation between oil price inflation and the CPI inflation rate.  
We do not plot or report the data to save space, but we are happy to provide the data on request. 
Data for the first three quarters show even more inflation. 
 
3 Kuwait’s low average growth over the sample from 1970 to 2006 is due to the inclusion of Gulf 
War I period when GDP collapsed. 
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dollar and its effect on domestic inflation, on their currencies, and on their 
incomes.  Figure 3 plots the real and the nominal exchange rates.  Figure 4 plots 
the US price deflator and the domestic price levels.  Domestic prices are higher 
than the US price late in the sample consistent with the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.  Table 1 also reports the average real depreciation rates and their 
values in 2006 (boldface and in parentheses).  The data suggest that GCC 
countries experienced large real appreciations in 2006 compared to the sample 
averages.4  As a result of the fixed exchange rate regime inflation could be 
imported from abroad, which we confirm in this paper.5      
 
So given the recent increases in incomes, the inflationary pressures and the 
appreciated real exchange rates, many of the GCC central banks and the 
business community have been feeling the heat.  The Arab Monetary Fund 
publicly viewed the peg to the US dollar as problematic, and suggested that a 
peg to another currency or to a basket of currencies might be a way to deal with 
the heat generated by the sliding greenback and rising oil prices.  The Monetary 
Arab Fund did not consider floating the exchange rates as a good alternative.  
The head of the Arab Monetary Fund said that the float would be technically 
challenging to the local expertise.  A few GCC central banks, e.g., Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, decided not to change their monetary arrangements; given 
that one would expect these central banks to re-value their currencies.6       
 
The primary aim of this paper is to understand these problems.  We ask two main 
questions:  first, what is the size of the effect of the rise in the real oil price on the 
“competitiveness” of the GCC? Second, given these recent concerns about the 
sliding greenback and the consequences income and inflationary pressures, 
would the GCC economies have been “better off” had they pegged their 
currencies to the Euro dollar instead of the US dollar?   
 
We consider the real exchange rate a measure of competitiveness.  Our small 
model consists of four equations for the real exchange rate, real money 
balances, real output and the price level.  We estimate the model and provide an 
answer to the first question by solving the model and computing the size of the 
effect of the increase in the real oil price on the real exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
4 See also the IMF press release No. 07/241 on October 29, 2007. 
 
5 The GCC countries adopted a regime of hard exchange rate peg against the US dollar in 2003.  
Kuwait pegged its currency to a basket of currencies since March 1975.  It switched to a USD 
dollar peg in January 2003 as a step towards monetary union for  the GCC.  Kuwait switched to a 
basket of currencies again in May 2007.  The US dollar is suspected to have the highest weight in 
the basket, but the weights are unknown to the public.  
 
6 There is a large literature on revaluations of nominal exchange rates under fixed peg systems.  
Razzak (1995) reports some real effects of nominal revaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
However, these revaluations must be very large in magnitudes and cannot be considered a useful 
policy recipe.  
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We are aware of two papers that examine the question of what basket of 
currencies should the GCC countries peg to, Erbas, et al. (2001) and Abed et al. 
(2003).  The first paper considered pegging the GCC currencies to the SDR and 
found out that while pegging to the SDR improves the stability of the exchange 
rates between member countries and the SDR countries (UK, Germany, France, 
and Japan), but not with the US dollar.  They found that the results are sensitive 
to the size of the estimated elasticity of exports and imports to/from the US, the 
SDR countries and to the rest of the world.  They reported that the stability gains 
from maintaining the peg to the US dollar outweighs the stability gains from 
switching to the SDR peg.  Abed et al. (2003) examined the US dollar peg versus 
a basket of two currencies: the US and the Euro dollars, and found similar 
results. They report that a basket-peg regime does not dominate the US dollar 
peg regime for improving the external stability.  
 
We don’t consider a scenario of a basket of currencies because the papers 
above already examined this issue.  Instead, we re-estimate the system using the 
Euro dollar as the measure of the foreign currency in the model, including the 
price for oil, thus we report two sets of results one for the US dollar system and 
one for the Euro dollar.  Regarding our second question, “better off” is measured 
in terms of the conditional variability of the model.  In a multivariate setup like 
ours, the conditional variance of the model is a function called the Generalized 
Variance (Anderson, 1958).  Precisely, we compute the  Sample Generalized 
Variance.  And, we provide a test statistic to test whether the country variance 
has changed significantly.    
 
On average (i.e., across the GCC and over the sample period from 1970 to 2006) 
we found that the effect of the increase in the real price of oil on the real 
exchange rate in the short run to be small.  A doubling of the real price of oil 
appreciates the real exchange rates (reduce competitiveness) of the GCC 
countries by about 3 percent on average.  For the Euro dollar model, a doubling 
of the real price of oil measured in Euro dollar appreciates the GCC currencies 
between 0.30 and 0.70 percent on average.  This is smaller than the US dollar 
effect by a magnitude of 10.  
 
We found large differences among the GCC economies to whether they should 
peg to the US or the Euro dollar, which might have implications for the monetary 
union or the optimum currency area.  Most importantly, most of the domestic 
inflation comes, on average, from foreign prices (imported inflation).  Rising real 
oil prices by a 100 percent add about 5 percent to the GDP growth rate on 
average.  We discuss these results and policy implications.   
 
Next, we present our model.  In section 3 we derive the test statistic for the 
conditional variance.  Estimation and discussion of the results are in section 4.  In 
Section 5 presents the calculations of the Sample Generalized Variance and the 
test statistic.  Section 6 includes our conclusions. 
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The model 
 
The actual real exchange rate is defined as , where is the nominal 
exchange rate (the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency (i.e., 
an increase denotes depreciation), is the foreign price, and is the domestic 
price.  
tQ ttt PPS /)(
*
tS
*
tP tP
 
There is a great debate in the economic literature about the exchange rate 
determination; it spans  a period of more than forty years. Harrod (1933), Balassa 
(1964) and Samuelson (1964) show that the real exchange rate is a function of 
the productivity differential between tradable and non-tradable sector in the home 
and the foreign country.  Messe and Rogoff (1983) argue that the exchange rate 
is a random walk process.  Most asset prices follow a random walk process, 
which is also consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, e.g., Fama’s (1970) 
influential paper.   But, there are also several different theories such as the 
monetary model and various versions of it, e.g., Mussa (1982, 1986), Frenkel’s 
(1980) real interest rate differential model, and Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting 
model.  Generally speaking, these models suggest the real exchange rate is 
perhaps a function of real money balances differential (money and inflation 
effects could be separated), output differential, and the interest rate differential. 
Then we had another generation of models, where government expenditures are 
the main determinant of the exchange rate, e.g., Edwards (1989), Froot and 
Rogoff (1991) and Egert, et al. (2004).   
 
It is conceivable that US variables play the most important role in affecting the 
real exchange rates of the GCC countries.  The US government massive 
expenditures and investments in defense could directly affect the real exchange 
rate in the GCC countries.  In countries that are major exporters of materials 
(primary commodity and metals) such as New Zealand and Australia, the term of 
trade seems to play a role in affecting the exchange rate. 
 
To encompass the models of the exchange rate determination, we assume that 
the real exchange rate has two components: a permanent component  and a 
transitory component  (e.g., Meltzer (1993) and Razzak (1995)).  
p
tQ
T
tQ
 
T
t
P
tt QQQ +=1  
 
Further, we let the permanent component be a linear combination of last period 
actual real exchange rate and a vector of variables , which 
includes: , where is money
tX
ttt DTOTPMPM ˆ,,)/(,)/(
*
tM
7, is the deflator, is tP tToT
                                                 
7 The theory does not really say what measure of money.  Researchers tried almost all different 
definitions of money and reported mixed results, but most of the evidence of the 1970s and 1980s 
models of the exchange rate determination found wrong signs. 
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the term of trade index and  is productivity differential in tradable goods, which 
measures the difference in tradable sector’s productivity between each of the 
GCC and their trading partners, i.e., the US, Europe and Asia).  The asterisk 
denotes the foreign country magnitude.   
tdˆ
 
ttt
p
t XQQ 21 )1(2 εββ +−+= −  
 
Substituting in the actual real exchange rate we get: 
 
tttt XQQ 31 )1(3 εββ +−+= −  , 
 
Where the error term t3ε include t2ε and .  The real exchange rate is a random 
walk if
T
tQ
1=β . 
 
Under fixed exchange rate regimes the central bank buys and sells foreign 
assets to keep the exchange rate fixed so real money balances are give by:    
 
t
t
t Y
P
M κ=4  
The CPI,  is a weighted average of the domestic price deflator  and the 
foreign price .  Non-oil production in the GCC is relatively small so we do not 
include the price of domestic goods.  Average non-oil production as a percent of 
GDP in GCC in 2002, for example, was about 3.4 percent.   
tPˆ tP
*
tP
 
11 1* )(*)(ˆ5 γγ −= SPPP ttt  
 
We model real output as a function of foreign income, (which determines 
foreign demand), the price of oil , the foreign real interest rate  and a 
random disturbance 
tY
*
tY
)( t
O
t SP
*
tR
tζ that includes uncertainty and other shocks. Note that in a 
fixed exchange rate regime, where people expect (i.e., the fixed 
exchange rate to be maintained, thus the expected depreciation to be zero), the 
domestic interest rate = .   Real interest rates in the GCC countries are not 
necessarily the same because expected inflation rates might differ.  There is a 
large literature on the relationship between the foreign interest rate and the 
domestic economy.  The foreign interest rate could operate through the effect on 
the expected real depreciation as we mentioned above; exports and in the case 
of the GCC, oil; and financial flows.  For a discussion and review of this literature 
see Giovanni and Shambaugh (2006). 
0=Δ ets
tR
*
tR
 
);;;(6 ** ζtttOtt YRSPfY = ,  
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Putting all together, the model consists of the following system of equations, 
where the subscript GCC countries, i.e., a panel and lowercase 
variables denote the natural log. 
6,2,1 K=i
 
itititttitititit dToTpmpmqq 71514
*
131211111 ]ˆ)()()[1(7 εαααααα +++−+−−+= −  
ititit ypm 821)(8 εα +=−  
ititittit sppp 9
*
3131 ))(1()(ˆ9 εαα ++−+=  
itttit
o
itit yRspy 10
*
43
*
4241 )(10 εααα ++++=  
 
The model predicts that an increase in domestic real money balances 
depreciates the real exchange rate 012 >α . (positive sign denotes depreciation).   
The increase in the foreign real money balances due to the central bank sells of 
foreign reserves for domestic money appreciates the real exchange rate 013 <α .   
 
An increase in the term of trade will appreciate the real exchange rate, which is 
consistent with a voluminous literature showing the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, 014 <α .   
 
Real government expenditures increases real output and appreciates the real 
exchange rate as a result of an excess demand for real balances that results in 
an increase in the real interest rate above the world real interest rate - assuming 
expectations are unchanged. To restore the equilibrium real exchange rate at its 
level the central bank buys foreign assets, i.e., increase the money supply).   We 
try both the level of government expenditures and the differential with the US and 
Europe.  
 
We expect that 015 <α , i.e., an increase appreciates the real exchange rate.  In 
the real money balances equation 021 >α .  Given financial innovations in the 
GCC countries are not expected to be as high as those in Europe, the US and 
other advanced countries we expect 21α to be greater than one perhaps. 
 
In the real output equation, higher oil prices increase income of the GCC 
countries because they are major exporters of oil, so 41α is expected to be 
positive.  The foreign real interest rate is predicted to have a negative effect on 
domestic production,  042 <α , see Giovanni and Shambaugh (2006).  Foreign 
real output has a positive effect on domestic output, 043 >α .   
 
The restriction that domestic money and foreign money coefficients in the 
exchange rate equation sum to zero will be tested, i.e., 01312 =+αα .  The 
restriction in the price equation will also be tested, i.e., 31α and )1( 31α− .   
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
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The model is identifiable.  It satisfies the rank and order conditions.  After we 
estimate the model above we solve it for the real exchange rate and compute the 
effect of the real oil price on the real exchange rate. 
 
 
2. The conditional variability of the system 
 
Pegging the exchange rate to a stable foreign currency or to a basket of 
currencies aims at providing an anchor.  Stability of the currency that a country 
pegs to is an issue considered by the theory of the Optimum Currency Areas 
literature (Mundell, 1961).  So the second question of this paper arises; could a 
Euro dollar peg have provided more stability to the GCC economies than the US 
dollar peg?   
 
Our idea is to test whether the conditional variance of the model, which consists 
of four equations, has remained constant against the alternative hypothesis that it 
increased, in both the US dollar peg and Euro dollar peg.   
 
The conditional variance is the variance of the residuals of the model.  The 
residuals of the system in equations 7 to 10 above are distributed multivariate 
standard normal with a zero mean and a variance – covariance matrix .  The 
variance – covariance matrix is symmetric and diagonal 
∑
Ρ×Ρ .   
 
Let a statisticω , which could have any distribution, measure certain features of 
the residualsε  such as the variance.  If )10( << δωδ denotes the fractile 
of the distribution of
th)1( δ−
ω then δω satisfies the equation: 
 
δωω δ => )(11 prob  
 
We define a zone forω under some common distribution by defining upper and 
lower critical limits such that ω stays within.  In other words, whenω exceeds the 
critical limits it is considered a significant value (i.e., falling in the tails of the 
distribution).   
 
For a multivariate normal variable [ ]TT Ρ= εεεε L21 , , where eachε is iid , and 
if )1( δ− probability is maintained on each component, then the probability that all 
variables Ρεεε L21, are simultaneously falling within the upper and lower critical 
limits is 
 
Ρ−=− )1(112 δϕ   
 
The probability of falling outside the critical limit is 
 
Ρ−−= )1(113 δϕ  
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To satisfy a probability of ϕ−1 that all variables are falling within the critical limits 
on one sample when the parameters are the nominal values,δ must be: 
 
Ρ−−= /1)1(114 ϕδ  
 
For a multivariate normal like in the residual matrix above, the variance (of the 
population) is a function called the Generalized Variance, which is the 
determinant of the matrix .  The determinant of is called the Sample 
Generalized Variance, where is the sample covariance matrix based on 
sample of size .
Σ 2S
2S
n 8  Anderson (1958) shows that a convenient statistic for the 
generalized variance is the following form of the sample generalized variance: 
 
Ρ
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
ΣΡ−=
/12
||
||
)1(15 kk
S
nD 0>  
 
And . mk L2,1=
 
The matrix is computed by: 2S
 
∑
=
−−−=
m
k
jkjikiij xxxxn
S
1
2 ))((
1
1 
 
16
 
And  is approximately: Σ
 
∑
=
−−=
m
k
kSnmN
S
1
22 )1(1 
 
17
 
Which is the mean of .   2S
 
Unfortunately, for Ρ>3, the statistic has no exact distribution so we cannot test 
for significance.  It turned out that we can approximate the distribution by a 
(Gamma) distribution with two parameters, a shape and a scale parameter, 
Ganadesikan and Gupta (1970).  They showed that the 
kD
Γ
Γ  distribution is better 
approximated when .  10=n
 
The shape parameter is: 
 
2
)( Ρ−Ρ= nh 
 
18
                                                 
8 Anderson (1958) shows that the determinant of  is proportional to the sum of squares of the 
volumes of all parallelopes formed by using as principle edges
2S
Ρvectors of Ρεεε L,, 21  as one set 
of end points, and the mean ofε as the other with Ρ− )1(
1
n
 as the factor of proportionality. 
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And the scale parameter is: 
 
 Ρ
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −Ρ−Ρ−Ρ=Α
/1
2
)2)(1(1
2 
19
 
To simplify the interpretation of the statistic  we transform the distribution 
into a standard normal by computing the following:  
kD Γ
n
, khk DGu Α=
 
 
 
20 )(
 
WhereG is the distribution function of the Gamma distribution with the two 
parameters above, and then the inverse of  ku
 
)()(21 1 kk uDR
−Φ=  
 
)( kDR is distributed standard normal and therefore the values could be 
.  This should not be confused with a negative variance.    )(0)( kk DRDR <<
 
We will compute the statistics ΑΓ≈ ,hkD , and ku ),0()( μNDR k ≈  for the estimated 
residuals of the model.  Then for both the US dollar peg and the Euro dollar peg, 
we test whether the conditional variance for each country has significantly 
increased or not.  A significant increase implies values of > 
)( kDR
)( kDR σ2±  or > σ3± . 
The σ3±  limits constitute a zone of 0.99730 intervals for the values of , 
which is also true for non-standard normal distribution (Tchebysheff’s theorem).  
)( kDR
 
Values of exceeding )( kDR σ3±  are considered very significant changes in the 
conditional variance.9    
 
4. Data and estimation  
 
The data we use are annual from 1970 to 2006 when the foreign country is the 
US, and from 1991 to 2006 when the foreign country is the European Union.  All 
data are in natural logs except the interest rate.  Foreign real interest rates are 
the nominal 90-day rate minus last period inflation rate as a proxy for expected 
inflation.  All data are from the IMF data base.  Figures 5 to 12 plot the remaining 
data. 
 
                                                 
9 Razzak (1994) provides a Monte-Carlo experiment to derive the probability distribution 
for values of falling beyond the mk L2,1= )( kDR σ3± limit.  Random variables are generated, 
1000 values of and the probabilities are computed.  )( kDR
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All the data have trend except the US real interest rate (the 90-day interest rate 
minus last period inflation as a proxy for expected inflation).  Kuwait’s GDP 
(figure 7) has a break during the Gulf War I in 1990.  The common unit root tests 
that we use are not designed to handle breaks in the data; they confuse the 
break with a unit root.  Also, most of the unit root tests have low powers, some 
relatively different from others.  We test the data for unit root using common unit 
root tests for time series and panel data.10  We could not reject the hypothesis 
that the log-level data have unit roots, except for the real interest rate.   
 
Whether the variables in the panel are cointegrated or not is another concern, but 
we will estimate the regressions in first differences (except for the US real 
interest rate) for several reasons.  First, first differenced regression is 
approximately the same as fixed effect models and this is precisely what we want 
to estimate to account for the country-effect i.e., heterogeneity.  Second, we are 
interested in the short-run because the exchange rate and the price of oil are 
asset prices, which are very persistent (i.e., unit root, near random walk or 
random walk) so the long run is very long.  Typically, when good and asset price 
inflations are high the lags are short relative to the lags when good and asset 
inflations are low.  Third, to compute the Generalized Sample Variance for the 
residuals, they have to be I (0), which is guaranteed when we estimate our 
system in first differences because the levels are I (1).  Fourth, testing the 
hypothesis of no cointegration in a panel, and a system of equations, is dicey 
when N (the number of cross sections) is small (6 observations only) and T (the 
length of time series sample ) is not so long (35 observations at most and in the 
Euro dollar system is 15 only).   
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the log-differenced data (except the real 
interest rates).  These are period averages.  The average real exchange rate 
depreciations are between -1 and -3 percent depending on the foreign currency 
involved.  But in 2006 all the currencies appreciated significantly in real terms, up 
to 13 percent for the UAE.  Real money balance grew at rates between 6 to 8 
percent on average across the GCC, quite fast compared with Europe and just as 
high as the US.  With exception of Kuwait, which experienced a high rate of 
growth in the term of trade, most GCC countries’ terms of trade grew between 3 
and 5 percent on average.   
 
All GCC countries productivity differential with their major trading partners in 
tradable good sectors are either zero or negatives.  Relative to trading partners, 
the level of productivity in tradable goods in Bahrain increased in the mid 1980s, 
again in 2000 then flattened; increased right after the 1990s Gulf War I, then 
flattened in Kuwait; fluctuated wildly in Oman; increased in the 1990s in Qatar 
                                                 
10 We used the Augmented Dickey- Fuller (1984),  Perron (1997), Phillips (1987), Elliott (1991), 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003),  Sarno and Taylor (1998) and Taylor 
and Sarno (1998)).  We estimated a variety of specifications (constant, time trend, etc.) and 
examined a variety of lag structures using different Information Criteria. 
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then flattened; increased in Saudi Arabia over the 1970s but has been declining 
since 1980; and finally it has been declining all the way from 1970 in the USE. 
Kuwait’s real GDP has a break during the Gulf War I in 1990/1991.  
 
Most of the RHS variables in equation 7 – 10 such as money, foreign money, the 
term of trade, oil prices, foreign real interest rate and foreign GDP, could be 
assumed exogenous.  Least Squares method is a reasonable initial estimator, 
except that the real depreciation rate equation of the differenced model includes 
a lagged dependent variable.  Thus, 0),cov( 17 <ΔΔ −itit qε  .  Thus, the 
coefficient 11α is biased downward in Lease Squares.  We would also expect the 
other coefficient estimates in the real exchange rate depreciation rate to be 
biased and inconsistent.  For this problem and for robustness, we also report the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) results.  The instruments are several 
lags of the RHS variables because these variables are the ones that are readily 
available (see footnote of table 2 for the instruments).  These instruments provide 
reasonably long dynamic.  The number of instruments and the length of the lags 
have well-known disadvantages so we will restrict the number of the instruments 
to save some degrees-of-freedom.  We should interpret the coefficient estimates 
carefully.11    
 
Table 2 reports four regressions.12  The first two are with respect to the US 
dollar.  The second two are with respect to the Euro dollar.  For each case, we 
report Least Squares and GMM results.  The Euro dollar system implies (1) 
pegging to the Euro dollar and (2) oil is price in Euro dollar rather than US dollar.  
The samples are different.  The effective sample sizes are also different 
depending on the number of instruments used in the GMM regressions.   
 
Lets begin with the US dollar regression.  All estimates are interpreted as 
averages over the GCC countries and over the sample period.  The real 
exchange rate depreciation rate does not seem persistent.  The coefficient 11α  is 
0.30 and 0.23 and 0.13 in the Least Squares and the GMM regressions 
respectively.13  
 
Real money balances depreciate the real exchange rate, i.e., the sign is positive, 
and significant.  The size of the coefficient 12α , 0.63 (GMM) and 0.66 (Least 
Squares), which is relatively large.  Foreign real money balances appreciate the 
                                                 
11For GMM see Wooldrige (2002).  We appeal to the facts that the estimator is appropriate when 
the economic model is not fully specified and that it is a robust estimator because it does not 
require information about the exact distribution of the error term.   
 
12 In all regressions, we use a robust Newey-West method to calculate the variance-covariance 
matrix.   
 
13 The level of the real exchange rate is a random walk, but the depreciation rate is not. The 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from 1. The p-value of the Wald statistic is zero. 
 
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
 12
real exchange rate, i.e., the sign is negative, and significant.14  The 
coefficient 13α is – 0.69 (GMM) and -0.54 (Least Squares).  These coefficients 
sum to zero as some of the exchange rate determination models predict.15  
 
The term of trade also appreciates the real exchange rate, the sign of 14α is 
negative, and the coefficient is significant.  The size is relatively larger in GMM.  It 
suggests that a one percent increase in the term of trade over last period’s value 
leads the depreciation rate to fall (appreciation) by about ½ percent in GMM and 
¼ in Least Squares.  This results is consistent with most of the findings in the 
literature on the effect of the term of trade on the real exchange rate.  The GCC 
has experienced positive term of trade shocks lately because of the increase in 
the price of oil.  More than 70 percent of the GCC exports are oil and gas.16
 
Even though the model has productivity differential in tradable goods only, this 
variable is significant and has the right sign.17 An increase in productivity in 
tradable goods sector at home relative to that of the trading partners appreciates 
the real exchange rate.  It increases the price of non-tradable goods relative to 
tradable good prices, and it may explain the latest increases in housing prices 
and services.  
 
The income elasticity of the demand for real money balances is small in the Least 
Squares regression, 0.21, which is similar to estimates found in the literature for 
advanced countries.  However, it is not different from unity in GMM.18  This 
magnitude is higher than the typical short-run elasticity we estimate for advanced 
countries.  Actually, we expected it to be a little larger than unity.  But it is clear 
that the GCC banking system has come a long way.  Financial services are very 
modern and the use of plastic cards and ATM is widespread, which might explain 
the surprisingly low elasticity.    
 
                                                 
14 Students of the exchange rate know that the literature on the monetary model of the exchange 
rate determination and the real interest rate differential model of the exchange rate determination 
is full of empirical studies that show that money has the wrong sign and that the models’ 
restriction do not actually hold. 
 
\
15 The Wald statistic’s p-values to test this hypothesis are 0.8724 and 0.6828 for GMM and Least 
Squares respectively.   
 
16 We tried government expenditures, government expenditures to GDP ratio and the difference 
between government expenditures in the GCC countries and the US, and Europe.  We found the 
coefficient estimates to be insignificant so we dropped these variables from the regressions.  
 
17 Productivity in non-tradable good sectors is very difficult to measure.  The productivity 
differential in tradable good sectors between the GCC and their major trading partners such as 
Europe, Asia and the US, is calculated by the IMF staff. 
 
18 We test whether 121 =α ; the Wald statistic’s p-value is 0.7938. 
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The price equation is estimated in an unrestricted form and the restriction is 
tested.  The restriction holds very well in the US dollar regressions.  In GMM, the 
coefficients 31α (coefficient of the domestic price) and 32α (coefficient of the foreign 
price) sum to one.19 The result is self explanatory; on average more than 2/3 of 
the inflation in the GCC countries is imported from abroad, which is a very 
consistent feature of fixed foreign exchange rate regimes. 
 
In the final equation, an increase in the real price of oil has a positive effect on 
output.  Remember that these countries are oil producing countries, where oil 
and gas make up more than 2/3 of their production.  Our estimate suggests that a 
100 percent increase in the real price of oil at Dubai increases real GDP growth 
by 5 percent, reasonably high.  A one percent increase in the US real interest 
rate reduces output growth in GCC by about 1 percent.  The magnitude seems 
large.  The easy monetary policy in the US, i.e., lower exchange rate and lower 
interest rate, might explain the expansionary phase in the GCC and the 
consequent inflationary pressures.  The US growth rate of GDP has a significant 
and large effect on GDP growth in the GCC countries.  These results need no 
further explanation.    
 
Next, we computed the real exchange rate, foreign real money balances, foreign 
price, real oil price, foreign real interest rate and foreign real GDP in Euro dollar.  
We re-estimated the model and reported the results in the last four columns of 
table 2.   Foreign real money balances have huge effect on the depreciation rate, 
several times larger than the effect in the US dollar regressions.  The restriction 
that the coefficients of the domestic and the foreign real money balances sum to 
zero is rejected by the Wald statistic.  The income elasticity of the demand for 
real money balances is pretty small and significant at the 10 percent level only.  
Finally, about 90 percent of domestic CPI inflation is imported.  The restriction 
that 13231 =+αα  is not rejected.20   
 
If these results were to be believable then the GCC countries, on average, would 
have been experiencing more imported inflation from Europe than under the 
current US dollar peg.  This might be true since the GCC imports more goods 
and services from Europe than from the US.  In both the US dollar and the Euro 
dollar regressions, the statistic for the over-identifying restrictions of the 
instruments is insignificant so the hypothesis of over-identification cannot be 
rejected.   
J
 
We solve the model for and compute the effect of the increase in the real 
price of oil on the real depreciation rate in the US dollar regression. We found 
that a 100 increase in real price of oil would appreciate the real exchange rate by 
tqlnΔ
                                                 
19 The p-value of the Wald statistic is 0.4343. The restriction also holds in Least Squares; the 
Wald statistic’s p-value is 0.1257.   
 
20 The p-value of the Wald statistic is 0.7693. 
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3 percent only.  The adverse effect on the competitiveness of the GCC is trivial.  
For the Euro dollar regression, the effect of the increase in the real price of oil on 
the real depreciation rate is smaller by a magnitude of 10; a 100 percent increase 
in the real price of oil measured in Euro dollar would appreciate the real 
exchange rate by 0.30 percent only.   These results indicate that recent increase 
in the real price of oil has no significant effect on competitiveness on average. 
 
5. Testing the conditional variability of the systems  
 
The system’s four equations for qΔ , )( pm −Δ , pΔ , and yΔ have the residuals 
matrix shown in appendix 2.  We have a four-column matrix and six countries 
stacked.  Using Least Square residuals, we have 35 observations for each 
country (1972-2006) in the US dollar system.   For the Euro dollar, we have 15 
observation for each country (1992-2006).  For GMM we 28 and 11 respectively 
because of the observations we lose for the instruments.   The smallest sample 
is 11.  Ganadesikan and Gupta (1970) show that a sample of minimum 10 
observations is required to precisely estimate the Sample Generalized variance.   
n
 
Examining the residuals of all four regressions reported in table 2 indicates that 
all the residuals of the US dollar system are I (0).  The residuals of the Euro 
dollar system are much more difficult to test because of the small sample.  The 
unit root could not be rejected in a few tests.     
 
Figure 13 plots the 6 values of standard normal for the US and the Euro 
dollar cases from the Least Squares and the GMM regressions.  The US dollar 
test statistics are the light colors and the Euro dollar test statistics are the darker 
colors.  We could use either 
~)( kDR
σ2± or σ3± as critical upper and lower limits beyond 
which the static is considered significant and the null hypothesis of stability is 
rejected.21   
 
Both Bahrain and Kuwait are indifferent to whether they peg to the US dollar or 
the Euro dollar.   Oman is much worse off Bahrain and Kuwait under the current 
US dollar peg than a hypothetical Euro peg.  For Least Squares, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE are also worse off under the current US dollar peg, but Saudi Arabia 
is much worse off than the UAE.   In GMM, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are 
equally worse off under the current US dollar peg.  The three countries, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE could have been  better off pegging to the Euro.  
Qatar is the only country that is worse off pegging to the Euro.  The question is 
why these countries are so different and segmented is an issue worth studying in 
future research.  
 
                                                 
21 The conditional variability measure is positive as usual, but our test statistic was converted to a 
standard normal so there are positive and negative values and should not be confusing.   
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There is one concern about Kuwait.  Kuwait has pegged to a basket of currencies 
up until 2003, then pegged briefly to the US dollar, and back again to a basket in 
2007 as we mentioned earlier.  The weight of the US dollar is suspected to 
dominate all other currencies.  The question is whether Kuwait is affecting the 
results.  The statistics in figure 13 seem to suggest that this is not the case 
because Kuwait’s conditional variability is relatively low.  Nevertheless, we 
removed Kuwait from the model and recalculated the statistics. We found no 
change in the results. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We asked two questions: what is the size of the effect of the rise in real oil prices 
on competitiveness? And, would the GCC countries been better off had they 
pegged their currencies to the Euro dollar in 1991?  We provided a small 
estimated model for the GCC countries, which consisted of four equations: the 
real exchange rate, real money balances, real output and the price level.  We 
estimated the model in first differences; used Least Squares and GMM for a  
panel of the GCC countries; with a fixed effect for both the US dollar peg regime 
(1970-2006) and a hypothetical Euro- dollar peg regime (1991-2006).  We 
estimated the size of the effect of the rise in oil prices on the real exchange rate 
and then we provided a test statistic based on the Sample Generalized Variance 
for the variability of the system under each exchange rate peg, the US and the 
Euro dollar. 
 
Our estimates suggest that the increase in the real price of oil has a little effect 
on competitiveness – measured by the real depreciation rate.  Further, our 
estimates suggest that about 2/3 of the domestic CPI inflation in the GCC is 
imported under the US dollar peg system, and could have been up to 90 percent 
had the GCC countries pegged their currencies to the Euro dollar.  These 
estimates suggest that the GCC peg to the US dollar is probably less inflationary 
than the Euro.  Foreign real interest rate and foreign output growth have 
significant and large impacts on the GCC economies.  The increase in the real 
price of oil has a positive and significant impact on GDP growth. None of these 
results are surprising.  
 
Then we provided a test statistic for the conditional variability of the model.  We 
found that the GCC countries conditional variability differ significantly across 
member countries.   This result was a little surprising.  Both Bahrain and Kuwait 
are indifferent to whether they peg to the US dollar or the Euro dollar.  Oman is 
much worse off than Bahrain and Kuwait under the current US dollar peg. Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE are the most affected by the peg to the US dollar.   It could 
be argued that these three  countries could have been much better off pegging to 
the Euro dollar.  Qatar is the only country that is worse off pegging to the Euro.  
 
To fix the domestic currency to another, a major and a stable one, is to provide 
an anchor to the economy.  The same principle applies for a basket, i.e., the 
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
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currencies must provide stability to the local economy.  In the case of the US 
dollar peg, the GCC monetary policy must inevitably mimic the US monetary 
policy, i.e., domestic monetary policy is not independent.  Problems arise when 
shocks that affect the foreign economy whose currency is used as the anchor 
(the US economy) are different from the shocks affecting the domestic economy 
(the GCC).  For example, if the Federal Reserve Bank expects a recession it is 
expected that they will ease monetary conditions, i.e., lower the interest rate.  
And when the current account deficit is large the US dollar “could be” left to 
depreciate until the imbalances are eliminated and equilibrium is restored.  
Meanwhile, the GCC could be facing a different shock such as soaring oil prices, 
i.e., boom.  Swings in currencies are persistent.  In other words, the US dollar 
may continue to depreciate – if the US government does not intervene – until 
equilibrium in the current account is re-established.  So for the GCC to switch to 
another currency or a basket of currencies might only be a short-term relief, then 
what?  What will happen when the Euro dollar begins to slide at some point in the 
future?  The GCC countries could continue to peg their currencies to the US 
dollar and endure the pain, but for how long would they be willing to endure the 
pain?  It certainly depends on their tolerance level, the magnitude of the pain an 
the damage it might cause etc.  Alternatively, they could switch to the Euro or to 
a basket peg system, but the solution is also a short term one.  This is the policy 
problem.   
 
A more robust resolution to the problem lies in the government(s) choice between 
domestic price stability or currency stability.  The situation today is one where the 
GCC countries face different economic shocks than the US and their hands are 
tied behind their backs because the exchange rate is fixed to the US and 
monetary policy is ineffective and not independent.  Inflation is a serious issue 
that could undermine the GCC economies and most of it is imported because the 
current monetary arrangement.   
 
Central bankers and monetary economists know that they cannot stabilize both 
the exchange rate and domestic prices at the same time, one of them must be 
free to move.  The fixed exchange rate regime is a constraint.  It imposes a 
difficult trade-off between currency stability, monetary independence and capital 
market openness.  These three things maybe very difficult to have in the same 
time, i.e., the well-known tri-lemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2004).   
 
It will all depend on the country’s preference.  (1) If the GCC countries want 
independent monetary policy and free capital mobility then they cannot fix the 
exchange rate because it does not allow for a monetary policy independence.  (2) 
If they want to enjoy higher incomes from higher oil prices and currency stability 
then they have to accept inflation and its consequences.  (3) If they want stable 
domestic inflation then they should let the currency float – an inflation targeting 
system coupled with a floating exchange rate.22 Or, they could continue to peg 
                                                 
22 Economists have not settled the debate on whether inflation targeting is superior to price level 
targeting.  We will not discuss the issue here because its time has not come up yet. 
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the currency to the US dollar and endure the pain associated with its depreciation 
and higher domestic  inflation until the storm passes by.  Pegging to another 
currency or to a basket of currencies is neither a permanent solution nor the right 
question to ask.   
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE USA Europe 
 X  S X  S X  S X  S X  S X  S X  S X  S 
qΔ (US)i -0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.08 -0.02 
(-0.096) 
0.12 -0.01 
(-0.068) 
0.11 -0.04 
(-0.10) 
0.15 -0.02 
(-0.04) 
0.11 -0.06 
(-0.13) 
0.11 - - - - 
qΔ (EUR) 
)
-0.007 0.11 -0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.10 - - - - 
( pm −Δ   0.07 0.18  0.05 0.13  0.08 0.13  0.07 0.17  0.08  0.12  0.06 0.23 - - - - 
*)( pm −Δ  - - - - - - - - - - - -  0.07 0.16 0.03 0.02 
ToTΔ   0.02 0.11  0.08 0.27  0.05 0.27  0.03 0.29  0.05 0.25  0.05 0.22 - - - - 
dˆΔ   0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.13  0.00 0.10 -0.02  0.10 -0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.08 - - - - 
yΔ i  0.05 
(0.07) 
0.05  0.02 
(0.05) 
0.16  0.06 
(0.06) 
0.07  0.04 
(0.08) 
0.08  0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06  0.05 
(0.09) 
0.07 - - - - 
sΔ  (US) -0.006 0.02 -0.006 0.03 -0.002 0.03 -0.007 0.02 -0.005 0.02 -0.007 0.02 - - - - 
sΔ  (EUR) -0.000 0.09  0.000 0.09  0.004 0.10 -0.001 0.09  0.001 0.09 -0.000 0.09 - - - - 
mΔ   0.11  0.18  0.10 0.09  0.14 0.13  0.15 0.13  0.15 0.15  0.16 0.19 - - - - 
pΔ   0.05 
(0.108) 
0.09  0.05 
(0.119) 
0.12  0.05 
(0.097) 
0.11  0.07 
(0.132) 
0.15  0.06 
(0.073) 
0.12  0.09 
(0.163) 
0.18 - - - - 
pˆΔ   0.04 
(0.029) 
 
0.06  0.03 
(0.029) 
0.06  0.03 
(0.031) 
0.04  0.06 
(0.112) 
0.06  0.04 
(0.02) 
0.07  0.07 
(0.096) 
0.06 - - - - 
opΔ   - - - - - - - - - - - -  0.06 0.32 - - 
opΔ  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  0.06 0.23 
*R  
*
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.05 0.026 0.03 0.014 
yΔ  - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
All data are in natural logs except for the interest rates, asterisks denote the foreign magnitudes.  Nominal exchange rate s defined as the domestic price of the 
foreign currency ( USD and Euro alternatively); p is the GDP price deflator (2000=100) ; is the CPI (2000=100); q is the real exchange rate; m is money plus 
quasi money; is the term of trade (2000=100);  is tradable good productivity differential with trading partners; is real GDP (expenditure side); is the real 
price of oil (Dubai), and is the foreign 90-day interest rate.  The source of the data is the IMF-IFS and the World Economic Report. 
pˆ
ToT dˆ y 0p
*R X denotes the mean and 
S denotes the standard deviation.  The sample is 1970-2006 except for variables involving Europe, where the sample is 1991-2006. 
 
i  The numbers in boldface in parentheses are the values in 2006.
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Table 2 
itititttitititit dToTpmpmqq 71514
*
131211111 ]ˆ)()()[1(7 εαααααα Δ+Δ+Δ+−Δ+−Δ−+Δ=Δ −
ititit ypm 821)(8 εα Δ+Δ=−Δ  
ittitit sppp 9
*
3231 )(ˆ9 εαα Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ  
itttit
o
itit yRspy 10
*
43
*
4241 )(10 εααα Δ+Δ+++Δ=Δ  
 USD (1970-2006) Euro (1991-2006) 
 Least Squares GMMiii Least Squares GMMiv
Parameters coefficient p- value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
10α  -0.03 0.0003 -0.01 0.1737  0.01 0.6977  0.03 0.0212 
11α   0.30 0.0000  0.13 0.0001  0.23 0.0289  0.02 0.0001 
12α   0.66 0.0000  0.63 0.0000  0.93 0.0001  1.60 0.0000 
13α  -0.54 0.0848 -0.69 0.0876 -2.20 0.0001 -4.06 0.0000 
14α  -0.25 0.0000 -0.52 0.0000  0.004 0.9697 -0.31 0.0004 
15α  -0.14 0.1313 -0.35 0.0006 -0.07 0.7717 -1.1 0.0000 
20α   0.06 0.0000  0.02 0.1405  0.06 0.0000  0.05 0.0000 
21α   0.21 0.0769  1.08 0.0007  0.21 0.0772  0.11 0.1664 
30α   0.006 0.2860 -0.01 0.1044  0.01 0.0000  0.01 0.0000 
31α   0.15 0.0000  0.39 0.0000  0.07 0.0038  0.09 0.0009 
32α   0.70 0.0045  0.74 0.0000  0.03 0.2582  0.89 0.0002 
40α   0.02 0.0712  0.03 0.0061  0.05 0.0000  0.05 0.0000 
41α   0.06 0.0012  0.05 0.0287  0.01 0.5701  0.04 0.0002 
42α  -1.04 0.0003 -1.08 0.0000 -0.94 0.0521 -1.60 0.0000 
40α   1.20 0.0002  1.04 0.0007  0.63 0.4074  1.20 0.0004 
 4.02E-09i 3.74E-09i 2.45E-10 9.72E-11 
  0.13810ii  0.1955ii
i-Determinant of the residuals covariance matrix. 
ii-J statistic to test for the over-identification of the instruments, distributed. 
iii-The instruments are all in first differenced form and include a constant in every equation: eq. (8) [trend, 
eight lags of the term of trade, four lags of productivity differential, and four lags of government 
expenditures]; (9) [four lags of foreign real GDP, eight lags of the nominal price of oil, two lags of the 
nominal spot exchange rate, and four lags of foreign real GDP]; eq. (10) [four lags of the US price level] 
and eq. (11) [eight lags of the nominal price of oil and eight lags of the nominal exchange rate]. Kernel is 
Bartlett, Bandwidth fixed equal to 4, no pre-whitening, coefficients iterated after one-step weighting matrix.  
Convergence achieved after 1 weight matrix and 6 total coefficient iterations. 
iv- The instruments: eq. (8) [four lags of the term of trade, four lags of the real money balances, four lags 
of the foreign real money balances, and four lags of productivity differential]; eq. (9) [four lags of foreign 
real GDP]; eq. (10) [four lags of domestic price level] and eq. (11) [four lags of the nominal price of oil 
and four lags of the nominal exchange rate.  Kernel is Bartlett. Bandwidth is fixed equal to 3. no pre-
whitening, coefficients iterated after one-step weighting matrix.  Convergence achieved after 1 weight 
matrix and 6 total coefficient iterations.  The restriction in equation (10) that 13231 =+αα is tested and the 
Wald statistic P-values are 0.1257, 0.4343, 0.00 and 0.7693 in the four regressions respectively. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1 – Continued 
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We sum of the CPI and the GDP deflator for each country and take the average then we average across the six GCC countries. 
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Figure 2: GDP Growth & Change in Inflation 1970-2006
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Figure 3: Log Real and Nominal Exchange Rates
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Figure 4: US and GCC Log Price Deflator
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Figure 5: Log Real Money Balances
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Figure 6: Log Term of Trade
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Figure 7: Log Real GDP
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Figure 8: Log Price of Oil
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Figure 9: Log GDP Deflator
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
 33
-1.3
-1.2
-1.1
-1.0
-0.9
-0.8
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Bahrain
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Kuwait
-1.9
-1.8
-1.7
-1.6
-1.5
-1.4
-1.3
-1.2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Oman
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Qatar
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Saudi Arabia
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
UAE
Figure 10: Log Productivity Differential
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Figure 11: Log Real Money Balances
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Figure 13: Test Statistic for Sample Generalized Variance
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi
Arabia
UAE
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
N
o
r
m
a
l
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
R
 
(
D
)
US
Euro
US(GMM)
Euro(GMM)
 
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
 36
Appendix 1: Data  
Source: IMF database, IMF-IFS and the World Economic Report.  Data are 
available upon request. 
Variable  
s  Nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic price of a unit of a foreign 
currency (increase means depreciation)  
p  Domestic GDP deflator (2000=100) 
*p  Foreign GDP deflator (2000=100) 
pˆ  Domestic CPI (2000=100) 
q  pps −+ *  
m  Domestic money plus quasi money 
*m  Foreign money plus quasi money 
tot  Term of trade index (2000=100) 
dˆ  Tradable good productivity differential with the GCC trading partners 
y  Domestic expenditure side real GDP (production side GDP is not available) 
*y  Foreign expenditure side real GDP 
op  Dubai price of oil in US dollars deflated by the last period CPI  
*R  The 90-day real interest rate measured by the 90-day rate minus last period 
inflation rate as a proxy for expected inflation 
W A Razzak, 1/3/2008 
 37
 
Appendix 2: Residuals Matrix 
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